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A DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR 
MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
ASSESSING THE EU’S DRAFT CONSTITUTION 
EPIN WORKING PAPER NO. 8/JULY 2003 
KIRSTY HUGHES
* 
Introduction 
The draft Constitution is on the table. Attention is moving towards the traditional 
intergovernmental game that will be played out at the intergovernmental conference (IGC) 
during autumn 2003 – and quite possibly into early 2004 (despite the intentions of the Italian 
presidency). Much of the structure and the detailed substance of the draft treaty will stay but 
the IGC will be far from a rubber-stamp exercise. Moreover, despite the pessimists’ (or 
perhaps realists’) view that the IGC will only make the draft Constitution worse, the 
governments do have an opportunity to improve and clarify many areas. Certainly a number 
of issues will still be hotly contested not least on the core institutional questions. 
In many ways, the results of the Future of Europe Convention represent an important step 
forward. The operation of the Convention itself, through its relative openness, was a 
significant development. The existence of a single Constitutional Treaty is an important move 
in the right direction. The Convention also achieved considerable simplification in some 
areas, and some very important democratic steps were taken.  
But the Convention has also thrown up a number of problems. Despite its openness, the core 
institutional debate was conducted largely behind closed doors and in considerable haste. It is 
far from clear that the procedures followed for the Convention’s institutional work were even 
as good as, let alone better than, an IGC. In this respect the procedures deviated strongly from 
that followed for all other areas of the Convention’s work. In some ways, the draft 
Constitutional Treaty introduces more complexity than more simplicity – particularly in the 
dual presidencies of Commission and European Council. Crucially, there are some big gaps 
on the democratic front, notably on the accountability of the executive. 
The result of the Convention was a compromise and consequently it is not easy or necessarily 
advisable to try to identify winners and losers. Nevertheless, it is clear by looking at the three 
main institutions that the European Parliament has been strengthened in important ways. But 
the picture is much less clear for the Commission and Council, where turf-fighting and 
confusion looks likely to be one of the legacies of the changes proposed, with neither 
institution ending up substantially strengthened. 
Many of the divides in the Convention were between larger and smaller countries as much as 
the inevitable conflict between intergovernmental and integrationist points of view. All sides 
can claim some successes. But the compromises that were necessary to balance these points 
of view have produced an outcome that, on the one hand, could function fairly well and 
represent a step forward but that could, on the other hand, equally result in institutional 
malfunctioning. Which of these two outcomes occurs will depend not only on the political 
personalities involved but also on relations between the institutions (and whether member 
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states get involved in any of the ongoing battles that may develop between personalities or 
institutions). 
Overall, the draft treaty is at least a substantial step forward from the inadequacies of the Nice 
Treaty. Its structure will act as the basic framework for the EU’s politics and policies for 
many years to come – though revisions will certainly occur. But some of its central and messy 
compromises leave much uncertainty as to the future functioning of the enlarged EU. 
1.  The Convention process – pluses and minuses 
Overall, the Convention proved itself superior as a method for preparing treaty change 
compared with a stand-alone IGC. The openness of the proceedings and the inclusion of 
representatives of national parliaments, the European Parliament and the Commission all 
underpinned the deliberative approach that allowed a much more thorough and in-depth 
analysis of the issues. The very example of the Convention highlights the secrecy of IGC 
negotiations, adding to the pressure for much more openness about the forthcoming IGC.  
The openness of the Convention did not translate into a wide public debate – partly because 
no priority of either time or funding was given to such a debate. Nonetheless, it did allow a 
much wider and informed discussion than previous IGCs. There was also greater access to the 
Convention among journalists, NGOs, unions, business, regional bodies, think-tanks, 
academics and others. National parliaments were in a position to engage deeply in the debates 
given not only the Convention’s openness but also the presence of national MPs – though it 
does not seem in general that parliaments strongly exploited this opportunity. The simple 
principle of open access for any member of the public to the Convention debates is an 
important democratic principle in its own right. 
For many of the major areas, such as simplification of legislation, foreign policy and freedom, 
security and justice, the Convention proceeded in clear stages allowing substantial time for 
analysis of the issues. First of all, there was an open plenary debate on the basis of detailed 
and well-prepared secretariat documents, followed by in-depth examination in a series of 
working group meetings, with another plenary session then examining the working group 
report. Only after this sequence of debates were draft treaty articles put forward. 
This rather thorough process had a number of important weaknesses, however, and broke 
down entirely in the case of institutions. Despite working for over 16 months, the Convention 
only considered draft treaty articles in its final four months. Regardless of long debates over 
the treaty articles and thousands of written amendments, the first revised version of most of 
the articles (but even then not all) was only produced at the end of May. This timing left only 
two weeks to debate the revised version and to simultaneously deal with the heart of the 
institutional debate. After the presentation of the draft treaty to the Thessaloniki summit on 20 
June, the Convention had two final sessions in July dealing with parts three and four of the 
treaty, which allowed for very limited debate and changes. 
The consequence of this truncation and imbalance in the Convention’s debates, with its 
serious limiting of the debates on key issues (institutional reform, the revised treaty articles, 
and parts three and four of the treaty), meant considerable power rested in the hands of the 
praesidium. The praesidium met in private and did not publish its minutes. Its own internal 
politics was not straightforward and the praesidium was not a cohesive collegiate group. It 
was dominated by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, as Chairman, John Kerr as Head of Secretariat, 
and to a lesser extent, by the two Vice-Chairmen, Jean-Luc Dehaene and Giuliano Amato. 
The Convention certainly needed a steering group. But the excessive and secretive power of 
the praesidium, which in itself was not anyway representative, and particularly of Giscard  A  DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
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himself as the Chairman, is one central aspect of the Convention method that should be 
substantially revised before it is used for future treaty change. 
2.  The Convention approach to institutional issues 
In the core institutional debates, the Convention method as described above was put to one 
side – with remarkably little comment, protest or debate from Convention members. The 
institutional issues were seen, rightly, as the most divisive and were deliberately left until the 
end of the process by Giscard. No working groups were established on institutions or on 
democracy, on the grounds that all members of the Convention would want to participate in 
those debates and discussions. But in the event, the absence of working groups did not lead to 
longer detailed deliberation in the Convention plenary but just to an absence of that 
deliberation. Meanwhile, a considerable institutional debate was taking place outside the 
Convention, triggered in early 2002 by the UK and France, with their proposal for a 
permanent president of the European Council. 
This parallel external debate, particularly among the member states, only converged with the 
Convention when it discussed institutional issues for the first time in January 2003.
1 The 
sharp, political debate revealed a striking split within the Convention between the larger 
countries on one side and the smaller countries, MEPs and Commission on the other. There 
was a striking contrast also between the excellent and lengthy documents the secretariat had 
produced for all other plenary debates and the very short, weak paper put forward for the 
January debate. Consequently, the Convention debate focused instead on the Franco-German 
paper on institutions produced two days earlier,
2 with the smaller countries criticising it 
sharply.  
What happened after this debate is the most significant of all. The Convention did not move 
on to further, more detailed institutional discussions. Papers were not put forward by the 
praesidium setting out issues, questions and options for solutions (it appears that more 
detailed institutional papers were produced by the secretariat but not discussed even by the 
praesidium). Rather, in February 2003 the Convention moved on to discuss social and 
regional issues and the first draft treaty articles. At the end of February, Giscard announced 
that the draft institutional articles would be put to the Convention at the end of April – which 
is what indeed happened (after a stormy two-day praesidium meeting, halfway through which 
Giscard’s personal proposals for institutions were leaked to Le Monde). By this stage it was 
very clear that the Convention’s institutional debate was being curtailed and pre-empted. 
Some hoped that the overall timetable of the Convention could be extended – and Giscard 
seemed to be among those aiming to do this – a request that the member states rejected. While 
it was obvious that little time was being made available for the institutional debate, there was 
a striking absence of specific demands for more in-depth secretariat papers on the institutions 
and for more plenary sessions on the institutions before the draft treaty articles were 
produced.  
A full discussion of the draft articles on the institutions only took place at the mid-May 
meeting of the Convention. The majority of the Convention members, notably still the smaller 
countries and the MEPs were extremely unhappy with the draft. But again, the Convention 
moved away from the institutional debate, with its end-of-May session receiving the first 
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revision of the treaty articles (with the exception of the institutional articles). This session also 
focused, somewhat curiously at this late stage, on issues such as enhanced cooperation and 
economic governance. Proposals for revising the institutional articles were finally given in 
oral presentations on Friday, 6 June by Giscard and the two vice-presidents to the Convention, 
which was split into its four constituent groups – governments, national MPs, MEPs and 
Commission. Some but not all of these meetings were open. The actual draft text was not 
available until 10 June, just three days before the formal concluding session on Friday 13 
June. The split between large and small countries was also overlaid in these last weeks with a 
different split between those who wanted to maintain key provisions of the Nice Treaty (led 
by Spain) and those who were ready to move beyond it. 
So the crucial stages of the institutional debate were not only squeezed into a very short 
period of time (with an absence of either background papers or revised draft texts) but much 
of the bargaining took place behind closed doors and in corridors. Giscard himself has called 
for the IGC not to make significant changes to the draft and in particular to leave the 
institutional compromise as it is. But the way the institutional compromise was reached means 
Giscard’s call has much less weight than it should have. Indeed, the fact that the Convention 
failed to follow an in-depth deliberative approach to institutions before bargaining places a 
large question mark against the value of the Convention method. This approach is also 
responsible for the fact that the institutional compromise is not obviously better than one that 
would have been achieved through an IGC. It is also responsible for the unfinished nature of 
some of the institutional proposals, not least with respect to the Council of Ministers. 
3.  The institutional compromise 
The institutional compromise that the Convention came to is built on a trade-off between the 
demands of larger and smaller countries, and between integrationists versus 
intergovernmentalists. These two sets of groups are not identical – smaller countries are not 
necessarily the more integrationist. While smaller countries may in general tend towards, for 
example, supporting a stronger Commission, most of these put greatest emphasis on retaining 
their right to have an individual Commissioner, something liable to weaken the Commission. 
Furthermore, in an EU of 25 or more, with 19 smaller countries and only six larger ones, the 
small members in many cases are more concerned to defend national sovereignty (for 
instance, their veto rights for instance) while the larger countries, even the UK, do not want to 
see initiatives they support easily blocked by one small country. Hence the UK supported 
QMV in asylum and immigration, but was blocked at the last moment by a German insistence 
on retaining its veto. Further complications came into the institutional debate as Spain and 
Poland in particular realised they would lose some voting power in the move to double 
majority voting, based on country and population – an issue that Spain is bound to raise again 
at the IGC. 
The institutional debate and battle focused to an excessive degree on the so-called ‘ABC 
proposal’ (supported by Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
President Jacques Chirac). The proposal called for a permanent president of the European 
Council (a proposal initially floated behind the scenes by the British, but first publicly 
launched by Jacques Chirac in March 2002). In the end, this proposal distracted attention 
from other important issues of reform around the Council of Ministers and also focused 
attention onto the balance of power between Commission and Council. The winner out of this 
debate was in fact the European Parliament. It has emerged with much stronger powers of co-
decision, established as the normal legislative procedure, together with more budgetary 
control. It also has more powers in other areas such as trade, justice and home affairs, and a –  A  DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
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debatably – stronger role in electing the Commission president, together with the Convention 
method now enshrined in the draft treaty. The Convention studiously ignored issues such as 
the location of the Parliament. But it is the proposed reforms and compromises concerning the 
Commission and Council (both the European Council and Council of Ministers) that have the 
most potential to become problematic in the future functioning of the EU. 
4.  Running the EU 
The enlarged EU will have three main public figureheads, according to the draft treaty: the 
European Council president, the European Commission president and the new EU foreign 
minister. There is potential here for rivalry between these three posts, most notably between 
the two presidents, and also between the European Council president and the EU foreign 
minister, as well as between the Commission and Council as institutions. Furthermore, since 
the European Council president is seen (rightly) as a core institutional demand of the big 
nations, then it is possible that the big and small nations will also intervene, if they can, in any 
ongoing turf fighting between the two presidents, particularly as the new president of the 
European Council attempts to define and establish his or her role. Such intervention may be 
the case even if, as now expected, the first European Council president comes from a smaller 
country. 
The new European Council president is expected to prepare, chair and drive forward the work 
of the European Council. But the president is to prepare the Council’s work and ensure its 
continuity “in cooperation with the president of the Commission and on the basis of the work 
of the General Affairs Council”.
3 At the same time, under the description of the role of the 
Council of Ministers, it is the General Affairs Council that shall “in liaison with the 
Commission, prepare and ensure follow-up to, meetings of the European Council.” 
Meanwhile, it is the Commission that will draft the EU’s annual and multiannual 
programming. Furthermore, the Legislative and General Affairs Council will be chaired on a 
rotating basis and not by the new European Council president, as the UK at least had hoped. 
The draft treaty also does not rule out (as an early draft did) the future possibility of 
combining the two president posts, whether in a double-hatted way or as a single executive 
president as suggested among others by British MEP Andrew Duff and former Italian Prime 
Minister Lamberto Dini in the Convention.
4 
Some of this allocation of responsibilities is welcome, which was pushed for by the Benelux 
countries, among others, to limit and tie down the new Council president and to ensure a 
strong role still for the Commission. But it also leaves the door open for substantial confusion 
and turf-fighting over who does exactly what and over the hierarchy between the roles. Will 
the European Council president, for instance, be able to add to or amend the Commission’s 
draft strategic programme and will he or she play the lead role in coordination and follow-up? 
The relative powers and roles of the two presidents in the end will depend to an important 
degree on what happens in practice, not least on the political personality and abilities of the 
first Council president relative to that of the Commission president. 
There is also an open question with the end of the single rotating presidency system as to how 
the rotating chairs of the Council of Ministers will coordinate their work with each other and 
with the president of the European Council. Here again some countries, notably the UK, 
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would like to see the new Council president chairing some form of coordinating committee. 
The draft treaty says that the Legislative and General Affairs Council will ensure consistency 
in the Council of Ministers’ work but this still leaves open the role that the new president may 
play. Many of these issues around the powers of the new president are highly likely to be 
debated again during the IGC. What is clear is that the move from a part-time role played by 
an acting prime minister to a full-time role is a strategic shift whose full impact will only 
become clear over time. 
There is also scope for confusion, both inside and outside the EU, over external 
representation. While the European Council president will represent the EU concerning 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) “without prejudice to the responsibilities of the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”, the Commission, with the exception of CFSP, “shall 
ensure the Union’s external representation”. Meanwhile the new EU foreign minister “shall 
conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy” and as vice-president of the 
Commission will also be responsible for “handling external relations and for coordinating 
other aspect of the Union’s external action”. Both the draft Constitution and the EU’s new 
draft security strategy presented to Thessaloniki by Javier Solana, High Representative for 
CFSP, emphasise the importance of coordination across different aspects of external action. 
Whether this new division of labour will be conducive to such coordination is at best an open 
question. 
With so much effort being expended on all sides to define the post of the new European 
president, reform of the Council of Ministers received less attention. Much of the argument 
about who should chair the different Council formations was also driven by attempts to 
expand or limit the new president’s powers. With the exception of the Foreign Affairs 
Council, which will be chaired by the EU foreign minister, the other chairs will rotate on an 
equal basis but with a rotation length of at least one year. How this rotation procedure will 
work, whether for example, it will be on the basis of team presidencies of a fixed number of 
countries and whether a period longer than a year will be seen as preferable, is left open. All 
of these questions are to be left to the European Council. A longer team presidency, of say 
four countries over two and a half years, will further emphasise the question of coordination. 
Will the chair of the General Affairs Council coordinate the team or will the European 
Council president attempt to do so? Will this team end up as a rival to the Commission? 
5.  A more effective Commission? 
The question of the Commission’s size received much greater attention in the Convention and 
in the institutional debates than the question of its accountability, or the election of the 
Commission president.  
The proposal of a two-tier Commission is a rather unhappy compromise between two main 
positions. On the one hand are those who wanted a small Commission, seeing this as 
potentially more effective, providing stronger collective leadership and thus control over the 
administration. On the other hand are those who wanted to retain a large Commission with 
every member state having a commissioner. While this proposal does have the virtue of 
creating a small college of 15 commissioners, who will run the Commission and each have a 
single vote in the college, it leaves the role of the outer tier of non-voting commissioners 
unclear. With limited political powers and responsibilities, there is a serious risk that the outer 
tier of commissioners may be substantially more likely to focus on lobbying and promoting 
national issues than under the current system. This likelihood appears even stronger in the 
light of the determination of most of the smaller countries, not least the new member states, to 
retain a ‘national’ commissioner. Ironically, if the behaviour of some of the small countries  A  DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
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pushes in the direction of intergovernmentalising the Commission, it is the large countries that 
will resist this (given the lack of any weighting by size). 
The principle of equal rotation between the two tiers is also potentially problematic. Over 
time it will tend to mean that there are two more or less fixed groups of countries rotating 
between the tiers, so the same countries are always working together. It is also unclear how 
the Commission president and the foreign affairs minister will relate to this principle of equal 
rotation, given their different roles and appointment methods. If equal rotation is only applied 
to the 13 other commissioners in the college, then once the Union reaches 27 members (which 
if it happens in 2007, it will be two years before these reforms come into practice, in 2009), 
there will be at least one country that will have to wait more than ten years for its turn. 
A number of countries, both small and large, seemed to have second thoughts about this 
compromise proposal and its acceptability to their publics. It is likely to be discussed again at 
the IGC. 
The election of the Commission president was seen by some, not least Germany, as a quid pro 
quo strengthening of the Commission in the face of the new European Council president. 
Indeed the Franco-German compromise on institutions revolved around France persuading 
Germany to accept the new president and Germany, in turn, persuading France to accept the 
election of a Commission president. But the election process is very weak and not a large step 
forward from the current position, given that it allows the European Council to have the key 
role of nominating one single candidate upon which the European Parliament can vote. 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer did not make any attempts to lead demands in the 
Convention to strengthen this election process. His position perhaps reflected, at least in part, 
the differences between his and Chancellor Schroeder’s views on European policy (a 
difference that seems to underpin Germany’s relatively weak and low profile in the 
Convention).
5  
However, some argue, not least in the European Parliament, that it will be possible to use the 
European elections to put forward different presidential candidates, making the procedure 
much stronger and more politicised than it appears at first glance. Whether the European 
Council will, however, simply fall into line and nominate the candidate of the party with the 
largest number of votes is not necessarily very likely. Some potentially difficult conflicts 
between the Parliament and European Council may be opened up here. As it stands, the draft 
treaty represents a rather weak and inadequate step forward in the accountability of the 
executive powers of the Commission and is also an inadequate step forward in the political 
strengthening of the president and commissioners relative to the officials in the bureaucracy. 
6.  Democracy and Efficiency 
The strengthening of the European Parliament is welcome in both democracy and efficiency 
terms. But the institutional changes to Council and Commission discussed above are 
disappointing in democratic terms. Executive accountability and legitimacy have not been 
adequately strengthened. The so-called election of the Commission president barely deserves 
the description ‘election’. Meanwhile, the new European Council president, is to be appointed 
(on a qualified majority decision) behind closed doors by the European Council and will 
similarly be accountable to the Council in private, with a very weak reporting obligation to 
the European Parliament. In the battle over the distribution of power between the two 
institutions, democracy and simplicity got left behind. Given the powers of the Commission, 
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not least its right of initiative, this is a grave omission. The legitimacy of the new European 
Council president will be very weak. Given that the post is likely to be filled by a former 
prime minister, appointed behind closed doors, it seems unlikely this new post will have 
adequate credibility with his or her peers let alone with foreign leaders such as President 
George Bush and President Vladimir Putin. 
But some important democratic steps forward have been taken. First and foremost is the 
opening up of the Council’s legislative process. The proposal for a Legislative and General 
Affairs Council will ensure a vital and long overdue democratic opening up of EU legislation, 
though some find it disappointing that it continues to combine legislative and executive 
functions. This reform has the potential to have very powerful impacts on media reporting and 
domestic understanding of European politics and European power – television footage of 
ministers voting in Council will make it clear where EU legislation comes from. However, 
many member states and also individual ministers within governments are not happy with this 
proposal and its removal of legislation from the sectoral councils. If legislation stays within 
the individual sectoral councils after the IGC, then it will be crucial to ensure that the 
legislative side of their work is fully opened up and ensure that it is not a token effort as 
suggested at the Seville Council (which proposed opening up at the start and end of the 
process). Even if the Legislative and General Affairs Council goes through, this is not a 
complete move to a second chamber system. The power of unelected officials in Council 
working groups will remain. Nonetheless it is a powerful move in the right direction. 
The new ‘yellow card’ system to give national parliaments a clear role in monitoring 
subsidiarity is also an important democratic step. The most important outcome here may be 
that the reform makes clear to domestic media and publics that their national parliament has 
full information and a potential role to play at the start of the process. If the yellow card 
system works, it will also encourage communication and cooperation across national 
parliaments. 
There are other important initiatives too. The inclusion of the charter of fundamental rights in 
the treaty and the establishment of a single legal personality allowing accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights are positive and important steps. The idea of citizens’ 
initiatives, introduced into the draft treaty at a very late stage, is also potentially interesting 
and imaginative, though whether it survives the IGC has yet to be seen. The communitisation 
of the area of freedom, security and justice also potentially has efficiency and democracy 
effects. However, the focus of the discussion in the Convention was much more on increasing 
effectiveness in this area and there are concerns about inadequate balancing progress on civil 
liberties and democratic controls. 
Much of the work on simplification impacts on both efficiency and democracy. Simplification 
of the legislative procedure, decision-making instruments and competences are all positive 
(though the breakdown of competences remains somewhat complex, with in fact seven 
different categories in the constitutional section, even though only three broad types of 
competences are named – exclusive, shared and supporting). The move to double majority 
voting and away from the complex system of individually weighted votes is an important 
move forward relative to Nice for efficiency and democracy. But it will be hotly contested 
again at the IGC.  
The extension of areas covered by qualified majority voting and not unanimity is also an 
important move in terms of efficiency, but it remains to be seen how much survives the IGC. 
France already ensured retention of the veto over trade and cultural industries in the closing 
stages of the Convention, as Germany did over asylum and immigration. Meanwhile the  A  DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
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extremely minimal scope to introduce qualified majority voting in tax looks set to be vetoed 
by the UK and Ireland among others. The so-called ‘passerelle’ clause that would allow the 
European Council to move to QMV at unanimity without treaty change is potentially 
powerful in allowing greater ease of change, though unanimity at 25 will be hard to achieve. 
This clause will also be contested at the IGC not least by the UK. 
The existence of one single treaty and of a first constitutional section is also an important step 
in the right direction for both democracy and efficiency. The draft treaty can hardly be 
claimed to be easily accessible to the person in the street, but it is nonetheless more coherent, 
more consistent and more accessible than before. However, the failure to take more time over, 
and give priority to drafting the first constitutional section in an accessible and understandable 
style tends to reflect the continuing elitist nature of EU construction. While of course taking 
account of legal and political needs, a more serious commitment by the Convention to 
bringing the EU closer to its people would have been demonstrated if a substantial effort had 
been made to road test the language and presentation of the constitutional section. Nor does 
Giscard’s preamble greatly help matters here – being overlong and hardly modern. Overall, 
much more powerful and thoughtful proposals on democracy could have been produced if a 
working group on democracy had been established. 
The ratification of the treaty, after the IGC, also raises vital political questions about 
democratic acceptance of European citizens and not only states of the new Constitution. A 
number of countries have already indicated that they will hold referenda on the treaty, 
including France and Spain. Some, notably Ireland and Denmark, are constitutionally required 
to hold a referendum. The UK in particular has been put under pressure by both pro-
Europeans and eurosceptics to hold a referendum. So far the government has resisted this 
pressure, arguing that the changes are not of sufficient constitutional importance. This 
position seems to reflect, however, more a fear of the ability of the government to win a 
referendum than a genuine view that the draft Constitutional Treaty really represents mere 
“tidying up” in the defensive words of the UK government representative on the Convention, 
Peter Hain. 
The new treaty has to be ratified at unanimity and so any rejection among the 25 states will 
certainly cause a political crisis. Suggestions by some that it should be made clear to EU 
publics that if they vote ‘no’ they should then leave the EU are the opposite of democratic. It 
would after all be entirely democratic – and pro-European – to reject the draft Constitution on 
the grounds of inadequate democratic steps forward. To suggest a simple ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
option gives no respect to European democracy. The eventual political realities of ratification 
and any negotiation around a rejection will depend both on the number and the identity of 
countries that say ‘no’. But to suggest continuing membership of the future EU requires a 
‘yes’ vote, before any country has voted, is arrogant elitism of the type that the new 
Constitutional treaty is meant to move the EU away from. 
7.  Foreign and Security Policy 
Giving the EU a real voice in the world and strengthening its capacity as a global actor was 
one of the three main challenges posed by the Laeken declaration to the Convention. But in 
the event, the Convention’s work on foreign policy and defence policy was strongly 
overshadowed by the Iraq crisis and the deep divisions provoked across the governments of 
the EU, both current and future members. This division drove home the point that institutional 
structures, and changes in those structures, cannot create a common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) in the absence of a genuine political commitment and political will to build 
such a common policy.   K IRSTY HUGHES 
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Not only did Iraq demonstrate only too clearly the absence of that will to build a common 
policy, but it showed up very clearly the unwillingness, particularly of the larger member 
states, to discuss and manage their differences and to minimise damage from following 
different points of view. Indeed, in the years running up to the Iraq crisis, the EU’s foreign 
ministers had precisely not discussed Iraq due to the ongoing differences of view between 
France and the UK. Not only did member states fail to even try to manage their differences, 
they in fact managed to maximise the negative fallout from their differences – with some help 
from the US (Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in particular). President Jacques Chirac 
has been rightly criticised for his insulting comments to the candidate countries over the 
positions they took. Equally damaging and inappropriate, though receiving less ongoing 
comment were the unprecedented blunt attacks made, not only by the British tabloids, but by 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw directly against Jacques 
Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. It was, moreover, the UK and Spain that 
led the moves towards the divisive ‘diplomacy’ of advertising European differences in the 
pages of the Wall Street Journal. 
It was notable during the Iraq crisis that Javier Solana had little option but to keep his head 
down; he had no role. The Greek presidency did their best, appropriately calling an 
emergency summit, but to little avail. It must be open to considerable doubt whether a more 
permanent president of the European Council and an EU foreign minister instead of a high 
representative would have been in any stronger position to prevent or at least limit the damage 
from, the EU splits over Iraq. Rather, such splits would call into political question the value of 
both roles. Some suggest that the Iraq crisis may lead to a leap forward in the EU common 
foreign policy, citing the shift from the disastrous failures of EU policy in the Balkans in the 
early nineties to EU peacekeeping in Macedonia at the current time. But despite the current 
EU role in the western Balkans, it is not clear that the EU has the strategic ability and 
common will that would allow it to act more effectively in future in the face of such 
challenges as the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 
The Thessaloniki summit considered a draft security strategy from Javier Solana, which is an 
important step and identifies priorities in promoting multilateralism, establishing an effective 
wider-Europe strategy and tackling current threats from WMD, terrorism and failed states. 
But even with its near neighbours in wider Europe, the EU faces an authoritarian state in 
Belarus and a failing state in Moldova. It is unclear that it has the strategy or common 
political will to deal with these challenges let alone the larger global ones. And in terms of the 
transatlantic relationship, key differences still remain, in particular between France and the 
UK – with France calling for a multipolar world and the UK labelling this a dangerous 
strategy. 
In the light of these challenges, the Convention’s proposals inevitably appear rather limited. 
The main step in the draft Constitution on CFSP is the double-hatting of the new EU foreign 
minister, responsible to the Council for CFSP and at the same time with the role of vice 
president of the Commission, coordinating external action policies. The foreign minister will 
need to take forward and develop the EU’s security strategy. But even if the partnership with 
the new European Council president is strong rather than competitive, this new post cannot 
take away the reluctance of member states especially the larger ones to cede national 
sovereignty on foreign policy issues and so to create a genuine substantive foreign policy for 
the foreign minister and president to implement.  
The draft Constitution allows for member states to request that the foreign minister present 
the EU’s position (when there is one) to the UN Security Council. The frequency with which 
this happens may be low. The draft Constitution also puts forward a list of eight broad goals  A  DYNAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING THROUGH AGAIN? 
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that define the aims of the Union’s external action across all policy areas. But there is little 
real progress in improving coordination across the different areas of external action. 
There are also important differences of view within the EU about the new foreign minister 
post. It was France that managed to persuade the UK that the double-hatted post was 
acceptable as long as the foreign minister was principally answerable to the Council not to the 
Commission. The UK is nonetheless concerned at the possibility of opening the door to 
Commission influence over CFSP. It is also likely to push for a different name for the new 
post – foreign minister sounding too governmental.  
But there are in fact risks that go in the opposite direction. If foreign policy is decided in the 
Council and the foreign minister drives external action policy within the Commission, then 
Council decisions may impact strongly onto initiatives that theoretically come from the 
Commission. This impact could extend to policies such as transport and environment, as well 
as trade, aid and development. The creation and the location of the new external action 
services was also seen as very sensitive at the Convention, with many arguing that a new 
administrative institution must not be created.  
The Convention debated at considerable length qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP, 
with a large number of Convention members arguing for its widespread use. France and 
Germany actually proposed using QMV in their joint institutional paper, although after the 
Iraq crisis France was considered to have gone somewhat lukewarm on the idea. But it is the 
UK in particular that is strongly opposed to any QMV in CFSP, even to the minor extensions 
in implementation that have been suggested. However, the possibility for enhanced 
cooperation in CFSP has been strengthened. 
In some ways, more progress is considered to have been made in security and defence policy, 
with an extension of the Petersberg tasks, the establishment of a European Armaments 
Agency and the introduction of the possibility of enhanced cooperation in defence. However, 
it is not clear why the draft Constitution commits member states “progressively to improve 
their military capabilities”. This is a specific policy decision that may apply at a point in time 
but not indefinitely (let alone for the 50 years that Giscard hopes the draft Constitution will 
last for).  
In an important step, enhanced cooperation in some forms is now to be allowed for in security 
and defence policy. Crisis management tasks may be attributed to a group of countries, so-
called ‘structured cooperation’ may be established concerning capabilities and the possibility 
for closer cooperation on mutual defence is also proposed. But this is a controversial area and 
will be discussed again at the IGC. The UK in particular is nervous about ‘structured 
cooperation’ in defence and any possible competition with NATO, also strongly opposing a 
mutual defence clause. However, much less controversial is the very broad ‘solidarity clause’, 
placed under the freedom, security and justice heading that commits member states to 
mobilise all instruments to prevent or respond to terrorist threats within the EU. 
But defence policy cannot in the end be separated from the need for a strong EU foreign 
policy to drive it. Despite the various proposals in the draft Constitution, the key question 
remains the – lack of – political will and commitment of the member states to build a genuine 
common foreign policy. In essence, the EU will move forward with a two-tier foreign policy: 
common policies and actions may develop over less controversial and lower-level issues, but 
member states will emphasise their national sovereignty and freedom of action in particular in 
major strategic areas and issues. 
  K IRSTY HUGHES 
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8.  Conclusion 
The draft Constitutional treaty represents a large step forward relative to the Nice Treaty. But 
the more pertinent question is whether it has met the three main Laeken challenges of 
increasing democracy and bringing the EU closer to its people, improving efficiency to ensure 
effective operation of the enlarged EU, and strengthening the EU’s role in the world. The 
draft treaty is a compromise and consequently it has made some steps to meeting these goals 
but much more remains to be done. Some steps forward on democracy in the draft treaty are 
matched by important gaps, particularly in accountability of the executive. Many steps on 
simplification and efficiency have been taken but whether they will cope adequately with the 
challenges of enlargement is more doubtful. On the EU’s role in the world, the Convention 
was inevitably limited in its ambitions by the demonstration the member states and candidates 
gave over Iraq of the feasibility of a genuine common foreign policy. 
In terms of some of the main institutional compromises, there has been some progress. The 
first, but very limited, steps to electing the Commission president have been taken and some 
steps have been taken towards creating a genuine small college of commissioners. But the 
election process needs substantial strengthening and the two-tier Commission risks 
intergovernmentalising the organisation. The creation of a permanent president of the 
European Council could be problematic, although the post has been substantially ring-fenced. 
Nonetheless, the institutional compromise does look, at least in part, like a recipe for ongoing 
turf fighting and confusion. And the IGC may not result in much improvement. 
In many ways, the Convention has inevitably been working in the dark. How an EU of 25 or 
27 or more members will work will only be seen in practice. The new treaty will not come 
into force until 2006 or 2007, with some of its provisions not operating until 2009 or later. 
And yet by 2010 or 2012, Croatia and Turkey could be members of the EU. By 2016 or 2017, 
within ten years of the introduction of the new treaty, many other countries from the western 
Balkans may have joined. And other eastern neighbours await, including Ukraine and 
Moldova who are looking for eventual membership. An EU heading towards 35 members or 
more is conceivable.  
Already, with its jump in 2004 from 15 to 25 members, the EU enters a new era. The ten new 
members will not simply absorb the old culture and ways of the Union. The EU will develop 
politically in new ways. Many big questions remain to be answered: will the enlarged EU 
forge sufficient consensus and commitment across its diverse membership to be effective, 
dynamic and close to its many citizens; and will an EU of 27 or more find genuine strategic 
direction and strategic leadership? The Constitution cannot and does not provide the answer 
on strategic leadership in the enlarged EU. Some of its tools will contribute to finding the way 
ahead. The EU may develop in part through building a series of multiple cores with different 
groups of countries cooperating more intensively in different policy areas. But whether such 
flexibility will enhance the operation of the future EU or lead to growing frictions is an open 
question.  
But many of these central future issues concern political interests, dynamics, interaction and 
dialogue that the Constitution cannot prescribe. As the EU moves into its new era, the 
Constitutional Treaty will settle for now most of the institutional issues and the focus will 
shift as it should and must onto the strategic and tactical politics and onto substantive policy-
making in an EU of 25.  
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